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THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD
TAKE A MULLIGAN: HOW THE COURT
SHANKED BY APPLYING THE PRIMARY
ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE TO GOLF
I. INTRODUCTION
Go golfing on any Saturday at the par-three Marriott Hotel Golf
Course in Manhattan Beach, California, and it is unlikely that you will get
to the sixth hole without hearing at least one shout of "fore." "Fore" is
standard for "look out" and is shouted when a golfer's errant swing causes
a ball to go astray.' On the golf course, shouting "fore" is likely to have its
desired effect--players within earshot will cover their heads for a moment
until the threat of an incoming ball dissipates. Thus, the use of "fore" is a
convenient and effective way for golfers to ensure that other players on the
same course avoid serious injury.
However, despite the ease in shouting "fore," and the grave danger
that it prevents, the California Supreme Court recently held that a golfer
need not be so careful.2 In Shin v. Ahn,3 the California Supreme Court held
that the primary assumption of risk doctrine applied to golf.4 Under this
doctrine, negligent golfers are not liable for the injuries they cause to co-
participants. 5 Instead, the doctrine reduces a golfer's duty to merely refrain
from recklessly or intentionally causing injury to another golfer.6 By
applying primary assumption of risk to golf, the Shin court ended a fifteen-
year period in which the specific application of the doctrine to non-contact
sports like golf had expressly been left open.7 Consequently, it seems the
Shin decision eliminates any vestige of the contact/non-contact distinction
and expands the scope of the doctrine to protect all negligent athletes,
1. See infra Part III.B (discussing the use of the term "fore" when playing golf).
2. See Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007); discussion infra Part III.A.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 582-83.
5. See id. at 582.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 582-83.
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regardless of the sport.
8
Although Shin is in line with the majority of case law across the
United States,9 this Note rejects the application of primary assumption of
risk to golf. While there is a strong justification for the doctrine's
application to many other sports, golf's unique nature does not raise these
same concerns.' 0 Typically, primary assumption of risk is an exception to
the general rule of negligence, and is invoked only when specific policy
concerns justify a deviation.1 This Note asserts that these same policy
considerations are not implicated in golf. Thus, golfers should be held to
the same reasonable care standard that is generally applicable in all other
situations.
Part II of this Note introduces the general concepts of the assumption
of risk doctrine. 12 It defines the meaning of the phrase "assumption of risk"
and explains both how and why it has been applied. This section also
examines the doctrine's historical roots in various negligence cases, and its
application in the context of sports-related injuries. Part II concludes by
focusing specifically on the application of the doctrine to golf.
Part III begins with the Shin decision and then discusses the
repercussions it will have on golf. In doing so, Part III first describes the
basic factual circumstances in a typical round of golf. Next, it explains
how Shin's recklessness standard will apply in personal injury litigation
arising from the most common forms of golfer misconduct-specifically,
whether such misconduct amounts to negligence or recklessness.
Ultimately, Part III endeavors to distinguish golf from those sports whose
participants actually deserve a lower standard of care.
Part IV argues that in light of golf s distinct characteristics, there is no
justification for limiting the duty of care golfers owe to their co-
participants. This section also explains how each reason that generally
supports reducing an athlete's duty of care is inapplicable in the context of
golf. Part V concludes by reminding courts that the primary assumption of
risk doctrine is an exception to the general duty of care rule, invoked only
when certain policy considerations justify a deviation. Since the usual
8. See Shin, 165 P.3d at 582-83.
9. See, e.g., Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001); Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d
705 (Ohio 1990); Gray v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Monk v. Phillips, 983
S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
10. See infra Part II.C (discussing arguments in favor of assumption of risk applied to sports
in general).
11. See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 391 (Cal. 2006).
12. The assumption of risk doctrine should be distinguished from primary assumption of
risk-the subject of this Note. This Note will explain how primary assumption of risk is a subset
of the broader assumption of risk doctrine.
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justifications for this exception are not present in golf, courts have no
reason to excuse careless actors whose dangerous conduct causes serious
harm to innocent participants.
II. THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE
Golfers should be held liable when they carelessly injure other
golfers; however, courts across the country have disagreed.1 3 Often, courts
effectuate such disagreement by applying some form of the assumption of
risk defense to golf.14  In Shin, for example, the Supreme Court of
California applied California's primary assumption of risk doctrine to golf,
and raised the level of misconduct required for liability to recklessness.
15
Other jurisdictions, while applying the same recklessness standard, do so
without ever using the phrase "assumption of risk."
' 16
Semantics aside, most courts follow the same reasoning when limiting
a golfer's duty of care.' 7 Such decisions are usually an extension of prior
case law that applied a limited duty of care to athletes in sports like football
and soccer.18 In extending the precedential law to golf, such courts have
often set forth traditional policy rationales behind the limited duty,' 9 and
have argued that these policies are also implicated in golf.20 The purpose
of this Note is to refute such reasoning. Since this Note focuses primarily
on Shin, most of the arguments herein are based on the policy concerns as
expressed by California courts. However, this Note also examines the
reasoning and concerns of other states and argues that such concerns are
likewise not implicated in golf. The discussion of non-California law is
consistent with Shin. Indeed, the Shin court cited to various out-of-state
13. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Golfers' Tort Liability - A Critique of an Emerging Standard,
24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 317, 317-18 (2002) (stating "authorities have generally
determined that recklessness should be the relevant threshold for liability").
14. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990) (noting that "'the
quidpro quo of 'an assumed greater risk' is a diminished duty."' (quoting Hanson v. Kynast, 526
N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ohio 1987) (Milligan, J., concurring))).
15. Shin v. Aln, 165 P.3d 581, 592 (Cal. 2007).
16. See, e.g., Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 963 (N.J. 2001) (applying the recklessness
standard to golf); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (I11. App. Ct. 1975) (applying the
recklessness standard to soccer).
17. See, e.g., Schick, 767 A.2d 962; Thompson, 559 N.E.2d 705; Gray v. Giroux, 730
N.E.2d 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Monk v. Phillips, 983 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
18. See, e.g., Shin, 165 P.3d 581; Schick, 767 A.2d 962; Thompson, 559 N.E.2d 705.
19. Generally, the traditional policy reason underlying this limited duty is the promotion of
participation in sports and recreation. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992)
(discussed infra Part lIC).
20. See, e.g., Shin, 165 P.3d 581; Schick, 767 A.2d 962.
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decisions in support of its reasoning.21
Subpart A of this section begins with a basic discussion of the
assumption of risk doctrine. Subpart B examines the historical roots of the
doctrine, discussing both how and why it originally applied.22 Subpart C
sets forth the variation of the doctrine as it applies today in the context of
sports, both in and out of California. Finally, Subpart D reviews several
decisions that have applied the doctrine to golf, both in and out of
California.
A. Traditional Principles of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine
The assumption of risk doctrine is a relatively new common law
23concept. Traditionally, the doctrine has been invoked as a defense to
24negligence. Generally stated, assumption of risk characterizes the actions
of a plaintiff who takes on the risk of injury in a given situation.25 In this
way, the defense is similar to the consent defense in an intentional tort
case.
26
Originally, the formal assumption of risk doctrine only applied to
certain situations. 2' However, in the last century, use of the assumption of
risk defense has evolved to apply to a variety of different fact patterns.28 In
fact, assumption of risk now comes in several forms, each triggered by
different conditions and leading to different consequences.29 Countless
21. See Shin, 165 P.3d at 588-91.
22. As will be shown below, the doctrine's historical application differs in California.
However, California's version of assumption of risk is not entirely devoid of historical influence.
Accordingly, understanding both how and why the doctrine originally applied serves the ultimate
goal of proving that it should not apply now. For a compelling argument that California law
regarding sports participant liability "stems from the court's carrying over terminology and
concepts of the traditional assumption of the risk defense," see Edmund Ursin & John N. Carter,
Clarifying Duty: California's No-Duty-for-Sports Regime, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383, 387
(2008).
23. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 8.6 at 198 (1st ed. 1999) (describing how
assumption of risk arose during the nineteenth century).
24. Nicholas J. Cochran, Note, Fore! American Golf Corporation v. Superior Court: The
Continued Uneven Application of California's Flawed Doctrine ofAssumption of Risk, 29 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 125, 131 (2001).
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (8th ed. 2004).
26. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 151 (2nd ed. 2003) (explaining
that "although many people may believe that 'consent' and 'assumption of risk' are rather
different ideas, some courts discern a functional equivalence among 'implied consent,' 'implied
primary assumption of risk' and 'no duty').
27. See Cochran, supra note 24, at 131-32.
28. See, e.g., infra Part II.C (discussing the modern application of primary assumption of
risk to sports cases).
29. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 21 at 231 (3d
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authorities have emphasized the legal complexities stemming from the
phrase's multiple meanings. 30  To compound this difficulty, the two
defenses overlap, and the "defendant may at his election avail himself of
either defense, or of both., 31  Shin provides a good example of the
intertwining nature of these two forms of assumption of risk, as the court
separately discussed each form at length.32
There are two forms of the assumption of risk defense: express and
implied.33 In express assumption of risk, a plaintiff expressly consents in
advance to relieve the defendant of any duty to exercise due care on behalf
of the plaintiff.34  A plaintiffs express assumption extinguishes the
defendant's duty of care in those situations encompassed by the plaintiffs
agreement.35 In this sense, express assumption of risk is contractual and
will be enforced unless it violates public policy.
36
Similarly, one may impliedly agree to relieve another of a duty of
care. 37 Thus, implied assumption of risk embodies the idea that informal
agreements waiving liability for unintentional harms should have the same
legal effect as express agreements that are otherwise valid.38 This same
principle is reflected in contract law, which generally recognizes the
validity of implied-in-fact agreements to the same extent as express
agreements.39
Historically, implied assumption of risk applied when a plaintiffs
knowledge and conduct suggested that he or she had impliedly agreed to
ed. 2007).
30. See, e.g., Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (explaining that "[t]he phrase 'assumption of risk' is an excellent illustration of the
extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law"); see also HARPER ET AL., supra note
29, at 231 (stating "[t]he term assumption of risk has led to no little confusion because it is used
to refer to at least two different concepts, which largely overlap, have a common cultural
background, and often produce the same legal result").
31. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 at 481 (5th
ed. 1984).
32. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007).
33. Samuel Frizell, Assumption of Risk in California: It's Time to Get Rid of It, 16 W. ST.
U. L. REv. 627, 629 (1989).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1977).
35. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 200-01 (explaining how the rise of litigation has led
institutional parties to contract to shift risk of loss upon customers and patrons).
36. Frizell, supra note 33, at 629; see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 197 (providing
legal theories that have compelled courts to void express agreements on policy grounds).
37. EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 204.
38. Id. at 204; see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1992) (comparing the
result of both express and implied assumption of risk and finding similarity in each instance
insofar as the defendant is relieved of the legal duty to plaintiff).
39. EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 197.
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relieve the defendant's duty of care.4 ° Consequently, plaintiffs who
voluntarily entered into a relationship with a defendant that had engaged in
obviously negligent conduct were found to "accept and consent" to such
negligence.41 In such situations, the plaintiff was said to have agreed to
"look out for himself, and relieve the defendant of that duty." 42 For the
defense to apply, plaintiffs must have known and appreciated the extent
and character of the risk that caused the harm.4 3 Furthermore, the decision
to undergo the risk must have been made "freely and voluntarily." 44 One
modem court, applying the historical standard, held that the defendant
could not successfully invoke the defense unless it was shown that the
plaintiff had an acute awareness of the numerous risks associated with a
given relationship.45
In many states, including California, implied assumption of risk is
divided into two categories: primary and secondary.46 As illustrated in
Shin, primary assumption of risk is a way of stating the defendant has "no
duty" to protect the plaintiff in certain situations.47 In other words, the
defendant is not negligent because he or she never owed the plaintiff a duty
of care.48 On the other hand, secondary assumption of risk is applicable
when a defendant has breached a duty.49 However, because the plaintiff
has voluntarily chosen to assume the particular risk caused by this breach,
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3 1, § 68 at 481. Note that while California's primary
assumption of risk doctrine is a form of implied assumption of risk, California law does not
inquire into a plaintiff's subjective knowledge. As will be discussed below, in Knight v. Jewett,
the court explained that a plaintiffs subjective knowledge is not a factor in whether primary
assumption of risk applies. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 485.
42. Id.
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D cmt. b (1997).
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 485; see also Tiller v. AtI. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318
U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explaining that primary assumption of risk
applies when a party engages in an activity with "certain hazards to life and limb"); but see
HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 262 (explaining that the doctrine may apply even when the
plaintiff is completely ignorant of a specific risk).
45. See Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778, 790 (D. Haw. 1993) (holding
that a defendant could not invoke primary assumption of risk as a defense to an action on behalf
of a deceased scuba diver who had known some, but not all, of the risks involved in diving at 140
feet).
46. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703 (Cal. 1992).
47. Shin v. Alin, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (Cal. 2007).
48. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703 (stating "'[in its primary sense the plaintiff's assumption of a
risk is only the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk.
In such a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was quite reasonable in
encountering the risk that caused it. [footnote omitted] Volenti nonfit injuria"') (quoting FOWLER
V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 21.1 at 1162 (1 st ed. 1956).
49. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 703.
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the law reduces or eliminates the plaintiffs recovery.50  In California,
secondary assumption of risk can also be used to state that the plaintiff was
negligent.5"
B. The Historical Evolution of the Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine
Commentators provide several explanations for the rise of the
assumption of risk defense. 52  Some see the doctrine as a manifestation of
the early courts' desires to promote individual responsibility.53 Thus, the
defense has been described as limiting a defendant's duty to those risks
deemed "incidental to a relationship of free association between a plaintiff
and a defendant. 54 Put another way, the liberty of the individual to "take
or leave as he will" served to protect the defendant from those risks that the
plaintiff chose to "take. 55
This theory is supported by the way the defense once focused on the
voluntary character of the plaintiffs actions in the face of a known risk.
56
Specifically, plaintiffs who voluntarily entered into certain relationships
with defendants were required to protect themselves from the obvious
hazards which arose from such a relationship.57 In these situations,
defendants owed a limited duty to protect plaintiffs from the obvious
hazards created by the defendants' conduct.58 At most, defendants had to
50. Whether the plaintiffs recovery is completely negated depends on whether the state has
adopted a contributory or comparative approach to negligence. See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty.
Coll. Dist. 131 P.3d 383, 391 (Cal. 2006) (explaining that since California is a comparative
negligence state, the plaintiff's recovery is merely reduced by the degree of negligence as
determined by the jury).
51. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 703 (explaining that in a secondary assumption of risk
case, comparative fault principles would apply). Note that this Note focuses on primary
assumption of risk-the doctrine that led the Shin court to lower the duty of care owed by golfers.
See Shin, 165 P.3d 581. Thus, while both defenses are related and often overlap, this Note only
discusses secondary assumption of risk to the extent it reduces ambiguity.
52. Though authorities provide various reasons for the original application ofthe doctrine,
the reasons are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Since this Note primarily focuses on the Shin
court's application of modem California law, the historical details behind assumption of risk are
only briefly discussed.
53. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 250; see also, Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary
Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 14, 14 (1907) (explaining that assumption of risk is one
expression of the legal maxim volenti nonfit injuria-an "expression of the individualistic
tendency of the common law, which, proceeding from the people and asserting their liberties,
naturally regards the freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole structure").
54. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 247.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 248; see also, Bohlen, supra note 53, at 14.
57. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 247.
58. See id. at 1163.
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ensure that the conditions were as safe as they reasonably appeared to be.59
There is similarity between this early articulation of the defense and
California's current primary assumption of risk doctrine: both forms
eliminate a defendant's duty to protect a plaintiff.
60
This theory regarding the rise of the assumption of risk doctrine is
consistent with various historic tort law principles. For instance, tort law
once considered it abnormal to impose an obligation to protect others.
61
While individuals were protected from external acts of violence, they were
not protected from the effects of their own personality or voluntary
62actions.
The rise of the assumption of risk defense is also viewed as a judicial
reaction to the rapid increase of workplace lawsuits brought by corporate
employees during the Industrial Revolution. 63  Specifically, this theory
suggests that the judiciary reacted to protect industrial interests by reducing
the potential liability of emerging new and powerful corporations.64 Judges
effectuated such protection through various applications of the assumption
of risk doctrine and held that such workers accepted all the usual risks of
the trade. 65 However, this view also notes that, over time, society grew to
disfavor the harsh result befalling industrial employees 66 and courts
responded by narrowing the scope of the doctrine.67 Such narrowing was
primarily accomplished by increasing the specificity level of the plaintiffs
knowledge of the risk.68 As one commentator stated, "precise and specific




60. See infra Part II.C (discussing California's modern approach to primary assumption of
risk).
61. Bohlen, supra note 53, at 14.
62. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 250.
63. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 204 (explaining that industrialization "resulted in
judge-made doctrines to handle cases of implied standards of risk"); see also Shahrokhfar v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653, 657 (Mont. 1981) (explaining "assumption of risk is a
defense which finds its roots in the employee/employer relationship").
64. See, e.g., Tiller v. Ati. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58-60 (1943) (explaining that
the general purpose for the doctrine of assumption of risk was to "give maximum freedom to
expanding industry").
65. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 568.
66. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 206 (explaining that the "political fervor" on the
issue of an employee's assumption of risk led many states to eliminate the doctrine).
67. See generally id. at 205 (discussing ways in which courts altered their ruling to create a
more employee-friendly result).
68. Id. at 206.
69. Id.
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The two views on the rise of the assumption of risk doctrine are not
inconsistent.7v Rather, the idea that the doctrine is the manifestation of
early courts' desires to promote individual responsibility is consistent with
the idea that employees who chose their line of work should be responsible
for their own safety. Ultimately, both views shed light on the true focus of
the doctrine-that plaintiffs who consciously choose to face a specific risk
should not recover when the very risk they contemplated actually leads to
injury. Furthermore, both views maintained that defendants have a
minimum duty to ensure that plaintiffs have the opportunity to protect
themselves."v
The assumption of risk defense no longer limits its inquiry to the
plaintiffs subjective awareness.72  Rather, courts have invoked policy
reasons for limiting the duty of care owed by certain defendants.73 Thus,
while a plaintiffs subjective awareness of risk may be one factor in such
policy considerations, the new approach now requires courts to articulate
the policy and explain how it is achieved by limiting the duty within the
context of a specific case.74
C. The Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine Applied in Sports
The assumption of risk doctrine now applies in many situations
outside the scope of the employee/employer relationship. 5 Since this Note
focuses specifically on Shin's application of primary assumption of risk to
golf, the analysis now turns to application of the doctrine within the context
70. To the extent there is inconsistency, it is with regard to when the specific use of the
phrase "assumption of risk" arose. Some commentators explain that pure assumption of risk
principles were tempered by the Industrial Revolution. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 53, at 14-15
(explaining how the industrial revolution caused society to become more interconnected and
ultimately prompted courts to temper pure notions of self sufficiency and demand "positive
performance of careful service"). This suggests that some form of the doctrine had been around
before the Industrial Revolution.
71. Bohlen, supra note 53, at 15-16 (explaining that in some situations the "obligation to do
more than afford others the opportunity to protect themselves is anomalous and exceptional").
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 74, 76, and 77 and
accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 968 (N.J. 2001) (stating "[t]he policies of
promotion of vigorous participation in recreational sports and the avoidance of a flood of
litigation over sports accidents are furthered by the application of [a lower duty] of care to all
recreational sports.").
74. See generally Ursin & Carter, supra note 22, at 384-85 (2008) (explaining that in
California courts have replaced the "consent-based" approach of assumption of risk with a regime
of no-duty rules rooted in policy concerns).
75. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 246 (listing other situations in which
assumption of risk applies beyond the master/servant context),
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of sports and recreation. When applied to sports, the doctrine seemingly
comports with its original purpose-limiting or excluding recovery for
injuries where the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks
involved.
However, in contrast to the historic model, sports cases that apply this
doctrine do not typically inquire into the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the
risk.76 Instead, courts justify the deviation from the general rule of duty on
policy grounds.77 Thus, to the extent courts use the phrase "assumption of
risk,, 78 it may be a misnomer since the true focus of the courts' reasoning
does not rely on the fact that a plaintiff knowingly volunteered to face, and
thus "assumed," a risk.7 9
The idea that sports participants deserve a special rule for tort liability
stems from the inherent difference between conduct occurring within sports
compared to all other activities. In sports, as one court put it, "behavior
that would give rise to tort liability under ordinary circumstances is
accepted and indeed encouraged. 80 Courts also recognize that the "normal
energetic conduct often includes accidentally careless behavior.""s In light
of these inherent differences, courts hesitate to impose an ordinary duty of
care in the sports context, fearing that doing so would inhibit vigorous
participation and fundamentally alter the nature of the activity.
82
Specifically, courts reason that competition would be discouraged by the
threat of litigation. 3 Additionally, courts express concerns that a "flood of
76. See William Powers Jr., Sports, Assumption of Risk, and the New Restatement, 38
WASHBURN L. J. 771, 778 (1999); see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992)
(explaining that the proper inquiry of a sporting participant's duty does not depend on "whether
plaintiff subjectively knew of, and voluntarily chose to encounter, the risk of defendant's
conduct").
77. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260 (11. App. Ct. 1975); Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Knight, 834 P.2d at 700
(distinguishing assumption of risk defenses in the sports context from those in "other settings"
and explaining that in sports the focus was on the contours of legal duty, whereas in other
contexts the focus was on the plaintiffs knowing and voluntary actions).
78. As discussed in notes 14-16, not all courts use the phrase "assumption of risk" when
limiting the duty of care of sports participants. See supra notes 14-16.
79. For an explanation why the inaccurate use of the phrase "assumption of risk" in
California stems from the California Supreme Court's retention of historical assumption of risk
terminology despite having abolished the traditional assumption of risk doctrine, see Ursin &
Carter, supra note 22, at 390.
80. Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990).
81. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
82. See, e.g., Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch., 75 P.3d 30, 37 (Cal. 2003) (observing "[to]
[i]mpos[e] a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit
vigorous participation").
83. See, e.g., Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Mass. 1989).
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litigation" might ensue if a duty is imposed to mitigate otherwise inherent
conduct.84 Finally, some courts still cling to historic notions of assumption
of risk and argue that the plaintiff's expectation of risk justifies that they be
barred from recovery.85
Three cases illustrate these principles: Nabozny v. Barnhill,86 Gauvin
v. Clark,87 and California's Knight v. Jewett.88 All three cases held that
participants in sports, while playing, deserve a reduced standard of care.89
In each case, the respective courts held that the general rule that people
must act reasonably did not apply to sports participants. 90 Instead, the
courts imposed a limited duty-to refrain from causing injury by reckless
or intentional conduct. 91
In Nabozny, the plaintiff was a soccer goalie who was injured when
the defendant collided with him inside the penalty box.92 The court
explained the inherent tension in setting forth the proper standard to govern
liability: "[T]he law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and
vigorous participation in sports by our youth. However, we also believe
that organized, athletic competition does not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to
the playing field.,
93
In laying out the standard, the Nabozny court began by distinguishing
between two types of rules: those designed to ensure that the game
proceeds safely and those that seek to keep the game as a test of skill.94
According to the Nabozny court, participants have a duty to refrain from
violating safety-based rules because such violations constitute a reckless
disregard for the safety of other players. 95 Importantly, in addition to
promoting vigorous participation in sports, the Nabozny court also
emphasized that the new standard would help control a "new field of injury
84. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994).
85. See, e.g., Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); see also
Ursin & Carter, supra note 22, at 384-85 (2008).
86. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
87. Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d 94.
88. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
89. See id.; Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d 94; Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d 258.
90. Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 97; Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 260-61.
91. Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 97; Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
92. Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 260. Note that in soccer, it is against the rules for an opposing
teammate to strike a goalie while both players are within the boundaries of the penalty box.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 261.
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litigation.,
96
In Gauvin, the plaintiff was injured while playing ice hockey when he
was struck by the defendant's stick.97  Like Nabozny, the defendant's
conduct in Gauvin violated the rules of the sport.98 However, the Gauvin
court held that the dispositive inquiry was whether the defendant had acted
with a reckless disregard toward the plaintiffs safety. 99  According to
Gauvin, this standard, and not whether a safety-based rule had been
violated, comported with the true holding in Nabozny.100 Gauvin's ruling
reflected the policy concerns discussed above. Specifically, the Gauvin
court explained that imposing liability only for a reckless disregard of
safety would further "the policy [of] vigorous and active participation in
sporting events."' 01 Without this standard, the Gauvin court believed that
participation in sports would be "chilled by the threat of litigation." 102
Knight v. Jewett set forth California's modem approach regarding the
duty of care owed by sports participants. °3 In Knight, the injury occurred
during a game of touch football during halftime of the 1987 Super Bowl.1
0 4
After the play, and immediately prior to the injury, the plaintiff had
allegedly told the defendant, who played for the opposing team, to "not
play so rough."10 5 The defendant, however, recalled that the plaintiff had
merely asked him to "be careful." 10 6 The facts of the actual injury-causing
event were also disputed. 10 7 While both parties agreed that the defendant
had stepped on the plaintiffs hand, they disagreed on the actions
immediately leading up to that event. 10 8 Ultimately, the plaintiffs finger
was amputated, and she sued for negligence.109
The preliminary issue in Knight was the validity of the assumption of
96. Id.
97. Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Mass. 1989).
98. Id. at 96.
99. Id. at 97.
100. See id. (observing "'Nabozny as establishing the standard of conduct to be willfulness
or a reckless disregard of safety"') (quoting Oswald v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 214, 406
N.E.2d 157, 159-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
101. See id.
102. Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 97 (internal quotations omitted).
103. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 590-91 (Cal. 2007). Here, "modem" refers to the
application of the doctrine since California became a comparative negligent state.
104. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 697 (Cal. 1992).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 697-98.
108. Id. at 697.
109. Id. at 698 (discussing the plaintiff's theories for recovery, including assault and
battery).
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risk doctrine in light of California's adoption of comparative fault
principles in Li v. Yellow Cab. 1° In Li, the court repealed the traditional
"all or nothing" contributory negligence doctrine that barred plaintiffs from
recovery whenever the plaintiffs' own careless actions contributed to the
plaintiffs' injury."1 In its place, the Li court announced that the plaintiffs'
negligence would be merged into a comparative fault scheme, whereby the
jury could apportion blame based on the relative responsibilities of the
parties. 12 This new approach to negligence affected several defenses that
had once served as a total bar to a plaintiffs recovery. 13
Prior to Li, California courts applied variations of the assumption of
risk doctrine as a total defense to liability in cases involving sports-related
injuries. 114 However, assumption of risk actually precluded the plaintiffs
recovery for two distinct reasons, which Knight explained were really
applications of primary and secondary assumption of risk.1 5 Prior to Li's
switch to comparative negligence, there was no practical need to
distinguish between the two types of assumption of risk because either
could bar the plaintiffs recovery.' 
16
Knight thus sought to articulate the distinctions between the two
defenses. It explained that in one sense, assumption of risk referred to
situations where the plaintiff and the defendant had engaged in activity
such that the defendant owed a limited duty of care to the plaintiff."7 In
such cases, a plaintiff cannot recover if the defendant did not breach a duty
of care owed to the plaintiff. 1 8 California courts commonly refer to this
defense as primary assumption of risk. 19 Knight explained that secondary
assumption of risk referred to situations where the plaintiff was negligent
for actively encountering the risk posed by the defendant's breach of
duty. 20 The fact that such conduct was negligent would bar the plaintiff
from recovery in a contributory negligence sense.121 After Li, however, the
fact finder would determine a plaintiffs negligence and apportion liability
110. Knight, 834 P.2d at 697 (citing to Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975)).
111. Li, 532 P.2d at 1243. Notably, Li involved a car accident, not sports. See id. at 1229.
112. Id. at 1243.
113. Knight, 834 P.2d at 701-02 (discussing how before the adoption of comparative fault
in Li, there was no need to distinguish between different assumption of risk cases).
114. Id. at 700.
115. Id. at 703.
116. Id. at 700.
117. Id. at 703.
118. Id. at 708.
119. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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based on each party's relative fault in causing the injury.
1 22
Having addressed the Li court's impact on both forms of the
assumption of risk doctrine, the Knight court applied the primary
assumption of risk doctrine and affirmed the trial court's decision to grant
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 23  After reviewing the
record, the Knight court found that the evidence established that the
defendant had been no more than careless in causing the plaintiffs
injury. 124 Knight then held that participants in active sports owe a duty of
care to avoid intentionally injuring another player or engaging "in conduct
that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport.' 25 The defendant's conduct in Knight during the
touch football game did not breach the legal duty of care owed to the
plaintiff.
126
The reasoning in Knight was based on the court's general
understanding of the assumption of risk doctrine at common law. 127 The
Knight court determined that whether the defendant owed a legal duty to
protect the plaintiff depended on the "nature of the activity or sport in
which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and
the plaintiff to that activity or sport.' 28 Underlying this was the idea that
sometimes dangerous conditions are integral to certain sports. 129  The
Knight court explained that there should be no duty to eliminate such
inherent risks 30 and emphasized that the determination of the existence and
scope of a defendant's duty of care were legal questions for the judge.' 3'
In limiting sports participants' duty of care, the Knight court provided
the same justifications articulated in Thompson and Gauvin. 132 The Knight
court explained that in the heat of active sporting events, like baseball and
football, it was normal for participants to occasionally act carelessly.'
33
122. Id.
123. Id. at 712.
124. Id.
125. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 697 (explaining that the court's consideration for the application of the
assumption of risk doctrine started with Li, but the court then proceeded to discuss various
secondary authorities).
128. Id. at 704.
129. Id. at 708.
130. Id.
131. Knight, 834 P.2d at 706 (italicizing the word "legal" to emphasize that defendant's
duty of care is decided by the court).
132. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
133. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
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Proceeding from this factual premise, the Knight court argued that it would
be contrary to reason to require players engaged in active sports to act with
more care than that which is ordinary in the context of the sport.'34 The
court argued that imposing such a standard would make it difficult to play
the sport without concern for liability.135 Thus, in order to prevent the
chilling of vigorous participation in sports, a participant should not be held
to the heightened standard of care that governs everyday conduct.,
36
The Knight court also theorized that a regular standard of care would
alter the fundamental nature of the game because there can be a fine line
between permissible and impermissible conduct under the rules of certain
sports.' 37  The court surmised that under a regular standard of care,
participants would be leery of engaging in an activity that could possibly be
viewed as impermissible. 138 The court argued that the nature of the game
itself would change because players would take extra precaution to avoid
such impermissible conduct.' 
39
Importantly, the Knight court expressly noted that its decision to limit
duty in the context of sports did not apply to less active sports like golf.'
40
While this wording did not necessarily bar the application of the primary
assumption of risk doctrine to golf, it does suggest that the Knight court
had reservations regarding the applicability of the doctrine to golf.
Furthermore, in each of the cases described above, the defendants were
involved in what seemed to be a "contact" sport-touch football in
Knight,'4 soccer in Nabozny,142 and hockey in Gauvin.'43  Thus, in
assessing the detrimental effects that a regular standard of care may have
on the players in sports, the recklessness standard had only been considered
in the context of contact sports.
Golf is arguably not a contact sport 44 and it must be questioned






139. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
140. Id. at 711.
141. Id. at 696.
142. Nabozny v. Bamhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
143. Gauvin v. Clark, 357 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
144. See Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148 (I11. App. Ct. 1997); but see Dilger v. Moyles, 63
Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing how the fact that a golfer may come into
contact with a golf ball compels the conclusion that it is a contact sport because of the risk of
injury).
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apply in the golf context. Would golfers participate less vigorously if
required to be careful? Would a return to a regular standard of care cause a
massive rush of litigation and overflow in the court systems? The next
section examines cases that considered these issues and applied the
assumption of risk doctrine to golf.
D. Variations of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine as Applied to Golf
The majority of cases dealing with golf-related injuries have chosen
to apply a recklessness standard. 45 These cases follow similar patterns of
reasoning by expanding on a prior decision that applied the recklessness
standard in the context of more active sports and concluded that golf also
warrants this limited standard of care. 1
46
Thompson v. McNeil147 is considered one of the leading cases for the
proposition that golf merits special treatment.1 48 In Thompson, a golfer was
injured when another player's misfired ball struck her in the eye. 149 The
trial court dismissed the plaintiffs ensuing negligence action for failing to
state a cause of action.150 On appeal, the issue was the degree of care owed
between participants in golf.'5 ' Ultimately, the Thompson court held that to
state a cause of action for injuries in sporting events, a plaintiff must show
reckless or intentional conduct.
152
The Thompson court justified its deviation from the general standard
of care by explaining that certain athletic conduct may be tortious in non-
athletic settings, but acceptable within the context of sports. 53  The
Thompson court argued, like the cases discussed above, 154 that the
recklessness standard would ensure that "the rewards of athletic
competition" were not stifled. 155 The court also added that "[s]hanking the
ball is a foreseeable and not uncommon occurrence in the game of golf.'
156
145. Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 319.
146. See, e.g., Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593 (applying primary assumption of risk to golf
based on the court's understanding of Knight).
147. Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
148. See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 588 (Cal. 2007) (stating "[t]he first court to apply
the reckless disregard ... standard to golf appears to have been the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Thompson v. McNeil").




153. Id. at 707.
154. See supra Part II.C.
155. See supra Part II.C.
156. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 709.
2008] THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD TAKE A MULLIGAN 107
Notably, the court did not explain how the promotion of vigorous
participation related to the fact that a shanked shot by another golfer was
foreseeable.
5 7
Another example of a court applying a reckless standard to golf is
Schick v. Ferolito,58 which one author called the "most comprehensive
endorsement of a recklessness standard for golf tort cases."' 59 In Schick,
the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's poorly hit tee shot.160  In
applying a recklessness standard of care to golf, the Schick court explained
that this heightened standard would allow for liability only in cases of
"clearly unreasonable" behavior.'6  The Schick court reasoned that such a
standard would ensure that participants would not be liable for conduct
inherent to the game. 1
62
Similar to the Thompson decision, the holding in Schick was based on
the policy of promoting the vigorous participation in sports and avoiding a
"flood of litigation."'' 63 Unfortunately, the Schick court did not specify how
golfers would participate less vigorously if they were liable for their
carelessness. The court did argue, however, that whether golf was a
contact sport was irrelevant and instead, focused on the fact that "coming in
contact with wayward golf shots" was a risk that a golfer "accepts."''64 As
in Thompson, the court did not explain how awareness of such a risk is
relevant to the policy considerations of promoting vigorous athletic
participation.
65
In Dilger v. Moyles, the California Court of Appeal decided whether
Knight's version of the primary assumption of risk doctrine applied to
golf.166 In Dilger, the plaintiff and two friends were golfing on the fifth
157. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 165 and 183, the Thompson court is
not alone in failing to connect the foreseeability of risk to the fundamental policy concern of
promoting vigorous participation in sports. For an explanation as to why courts fail to make this
connection, see Ursin & Carter, supra note 22, which describes the aftermath of Knight v. Jewett
and how some California courts have erroneously applied a second no-duty rule that focuses on
the inherent risk of harm within that activity. Specifically, Ursin and Carter argue that such
decisions "endors[e] a no-duty rule that is independent of the framework and policies of the
intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule." Ursin & Carter, supra note 22, at 418.
158. Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001).
159. Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 325.
160. Schick, 767 A.2d at 963.
161. Id. at 965; see also Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994).
162. Schick, 767 A.2d at 965; see also Crawn, 643 A.2d at 607.
163. Schick, 767 A.2d at 968.
164. Id.; see also Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ohio 1990).
165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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hole. 167 As the plaintiff prepared for her tee shot, she was injured when the
defendant's ball, hit from another fairway, struck her in the mouth.168 The
defendant claimed he was unable to see the plaintiff because a row of trees
separating the fifth and sixth fairways obstructed his view. 169 The parties
disputed whether the defendant had "yelled 'fore' upon hitting his errant
shot." 170  The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the primary assumption of risk doctrine
applied and therefore, barred the suit. 171 On appeal, the issue was whether
the doctrine of the primary assumption of risk should apply to golf-an
issue that was expressly left open by the Knight decision.
172
The Dilger court concluded that the primary assumption of risk
should apply to golf.173 According to the court, the justifications for the
limited duty owed by participants in active sports, such as flag football,
applied equally to golf.174 Dilger recognized that golf is not as physically
demanding as basketball or football, 175 but nevertheless reasoned that
because there is a level of risk inherent in the sport, the doctrine should
apply to limit a co-participant's duty to other players. 176 The Dilger court
articulated the risk inherent to golf:
Hitting a golf ball at a high rate of speed involves the very real
possibility that the ball will take flight in an unintended
direction. If every ball behaved as the golfer wished, there
would be little "sport" in the sport of golf. That shots go awry is
a risk that all golfers, even the professionals, assume when they
play.
177
The Dilger court justified its holding by explaining that a limited duty
would serve to preclude lawsuits and permit players to continue to enjoy
the sport. 178 The court reasoned that social policy required that players
should not be discouraged from participating in a sport that bestowed




171. Id. at 592-93.
172. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592-93.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 593.
175. Id.; see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) (using these two sports to
justify the court's position).
176. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594.
177. Id. at 593.
178. Id.
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numerous benefits to both the players and the surrounding community.'7 9
To substantiate its position, the court cited Stimson v. Carlson,180 a case in
which the Court of Appeal applied the doctrine to limit the duty of a
"captain of a sailboat who failed to warn his passenger of an intended
change in course."' 81 The Dilger court explained that "[wihile golf and
sailing may involve less strenuous activity than touch football ... [the] risk
of injury is still a real possibility."'' 8 2 Thus, it appears that the Dilger court
treated the mere risk of injury while participating in the sport as a separate
justification for applying primary assumption of risk to such a sport.
83
Finally, Dilger refuted the notion that traditional golf etiquette should
serve any role in imputing a certain level of care on a player. 84  Thus,
Dilger held that while it may have been proper golf etiquette to shout
"fore," there was no legal duty to do S0.185 In justifying this conclusion, the
court stated that whether a duty exists "depends on whether the activity in
question was an 'inherent risk' of the sport."'' 86  The Dilger court cited
Morgan v. Fuji County USA, Inc., which held that being hit on the head by
an errant golf ball was an inherent risk of golf.187 Notably, Dilger did not
explore whether traditional golf etiquette was relevant to what golfers may
expect to encounter on the golf course.
179. Id. Specifically, the court explained the benefits of golf: "Golf offers many healthful
advantages to both the golfer and the community. The physical exercise in the fresh air with the
smell of the pines and eucalyptus renews the spirit and refreshes the body. The sport offers an
opportunity for recreation with friends and the chance to meet other citizens with like interests. A
foursome can be a very social event, relieving each golfer of the stresses of business and everyday
urban life. Neighborhoods benefit by the scenic green belts golf brings to their communities, and
wild life enjoy and flourish in a friendly habitat." Id.
180. Id.; see also Stimson v. Carlson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
181. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593; see also Stimson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673.
182. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593-94.
183. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707 (Cal. 1992).
187. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594; see also Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (analyzing secondary assumption of risk, though not in the
context of co-participants).
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Il. SHIN, GOLF, AND RECKLESSNESS
A. The Decision
In Shin v. Ahn, the plaintiff and the defendant were golfing
together. 188 The defendant was the first player to complete the twelfth hole
and had advanced to the thirteenth hole while the plaintiff and another
player remained behind to finish putting.' 89 By the time the defendant
lined up for his shot from the thirteenth tee box, the plaintiff had finished
the twelfth hole and, by way of shortcut, ended up to the front and left of
the defendant. 90 According to the plaintiff, prior to the defendant's tee
shot, the two made eye contact.1 91 The defendant, however, claimed that
during his practice swing he had looked in the area where he was aiming to
make sure it was clear of people. 192 After the defendant took a practice
swing and saw no one, he stepped forward and focused on the ball for
fifteen to twenty seconds before taking his real swing. 193 The defendant
testified that at the moment he struck the ball he did not know the
plaintiffs location. 194 In any event, the plaintiff was injured when the
defendant's ball hit him in the head. 195 At the time of the accident, the
plaintiff had been at a forty to forty-five degree angle from the intended
path of the ball, and some twenty-five to thirty-five feet in front of the
defendant. 1
96
In the plaintiff's suit for negligence, the trial court initially granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk barred the suit. 197 Later, the court reversed
itself and held that triable issues still remained as to whether the defendant
was reckless. 98  The Court of Appeal "applied general negligence
principles and concluded that the defendant breached the general duty of
care owed" to the plaintiff when the defendant failed to ascertain the










198. Id. at 584.
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plaintiff's location before teeing off.199 Consequently, it affirmed the
denial of summary judgment, "holding that the primary assumption of risk
doctrine did not apply" to golf.
200
The California Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's duty
analysis and ruled that the primary assumption of risk doctrine does apply
to golf.20 It held that the defendant's motion for summary judgment had
been properly denied, but that the trial court would still have to determine
whether the defendant had breached the limited duty of care he owed to
other golfers 22  On remand, the factual inquiry was whether the
defendant's conduct was "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in golf. ' 20 3 The court stated that the record was
"too sparse" for it to ascertain whether, as a matter of law, the defendant
had breached this duty of care to the plaintiff.
20 4
Shin recognized that its decision went beyond Knight v. Jewett,
20 5
which expressly left open the issue of whether the primary assumption of
risk doctrine should apply to golf.20 6 However, the court examined its own
prior decisions applying the doctrine in various recreational cases and
found that its conclusion was appropriate.20 7 It cited several lower court
and out-of-state decisions to support its application of the doctrine
specifically to golf.
20 8
The Shin court criticized the Court of Appeal's heavy reliance on the
rules of etiquette in golf to justify setting a reasonable person standard of
care. 20 9 The Shin court argued that such traditional, within-the-game rules
should not impose legal liability when their violation causes injury to a co-
participant. 210 The court justified this position by analogy to other sports
where the violation of a rule within the game does not authorize liability for
injuries caused by such violations.2 1
199. Id.
200. Shin, 165 P.3d at 584.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 592.
203. Id. at 590.
204. Id. at 592.
205. Id. at 582 (stating "[t]his case represents the next generation of our Knight
jurisprudence").
206. Shin, 165 P.3d at 582-83.
207. Id. at 588 (explaining, specifically, that the court's decision was consistent with
Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1997)).
208. Id. at 588-90.
209. Id. at 590.
210. Id.
211. Shin, 165 P.3d at 590.
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B. Golf- A Gentleman's Game (Before Shin)
Joel Parkinson is one of the world's best surfers.212 In his quest to
win a world championship, this young Australian has surfed some of the
world's most dangerous waves, including the Bonzai Pipeline, a deadly
wave on the North Shore of Oahu.213 In light of his surfing heroics, some
may see it as ironic that Parkinson, when given free rein as a guest editor at
Surfer Magazine (thus enabling him to say anything about anyone), simply
had this to say about former world champion Andy Irons: "Whatever you
do, don't ever go golfing with Andy Irons. In fact, it's best to stay off the
course entirely if he's on it, because he's likely to hit you. '214 Parkinson
went on to discuss how Irons was the one who "never yells 'fore"' and that
on a recent golfing outing, Irons had shanked a ball and hit another
golfer.215
Parkinson's anecdote about golf might seem out of place for a surf
magazine, but his comments perfectly capture the concerns of a typical
golfer. As a professional surfer, there is no doubt that Parkinson has a
propensity for risky conduct.2 16  Yet, his commentary about Irons
highlights an important point-there is no place for risk on the golf course.
Furthermore, in criticizing Irons' failure to say "fore," Parkinson's
comment implies that even surfers who spend the majority of their time
traveling to remote locations are aware of traditional golf etiquette.
Finally, Parkinson's caveat to stay off the golf course to avoid the risk
created by Irons' presence signifies the potential for the fear of injury to
dictate the choices made by otherwise risk-seeking people.
Though Parkinson's comments provide insight into the normal
expectations of a golfer, a more complete background of golf is needed to
understand the impact of Shin's holding. Shin held that golfers must at
least act recklessly to be found liable for the injuries they cause.217 Thus, to
understand Shin's impact, one must first understand what amounts to
reckless conduct-a factual inquiry which will depend on the specific
212. See SURFLINE ASP WORLD TOUR ZONE, http://www.surfline.com/wctcontestzone/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009) (posting the results of the ASP World Tour in which Parkinson
finished third in the Power Rankings).
213. See WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BanzaiLPipeline (last visited Oct. 26,
2008) (explaining that more people have died surfing there than anywhere else in the world).
214. SURFER MAGAZINE, Jan. 2008, Vol. 49, No. 1 at 121.
215. Id.
216. See Paul Caprara, Surf's Up: The Implications of Tort Liability in the Unregulated
Sport of Surfing, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 557, 557-59 (2008) (discussing the risks associated with
surfing).
217. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 582-83 (Cal. 2007) (discussed supra Part ILA).
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circumstances of the case.21 8 Additionally, the basic facts and rules of golf
must be illuminated for the purpose of demonstrating how recklessness
may be assessed in a golf-related injury case.
Though the fundamentals of golf are straightforward, the game is
challenging because it requires meticulous skill and technique. In general,
players swing their golf club at a golf ball in an attempt to propel the ball
towards a distant hole in as few strokes as possible. 219 There are three
types of shots in golf-long, medium, and short. While each type of shot
requires hand-eye coordination, the intensity and form of the swing varies.
For instance, while the golfer's first swing involves a forceful backswing to
"drive" the ball, their final "putt" is a manipulation of angles and touch.
The enjoyment of the game stems from mastering these skills.220
Golf is usually played in groups of two, three, or four. Due to the
sport's popularity, it is not uncommon for at least one group to be playing
on each hole at a given course. To maximize land usage, most golf courses
are designed so that holes abut one another.2  Consequently, the tee of one
hole may be relatively close to the putting green of another. Accordingly,
players preparing to take their tee shot on one hole are relatively close to
the intended path of players shooting toward the green from another hole.
The combination of a golfer's inability to hit long-distance shots
precisely, the high population of players on a given course, and the fact that
the holes are usually adjacent to each other creates the risk of injury from a
misfired ball.222 However, golf is an ancient game, 23 and over the years its
players have developed various rules to minimize risks.224 Though many of
218. Id.
219. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n.39 (2001) (citing KENNETH G.
CHAPMAN, RULES OF THE GREEN: A HISTORY OF THE RULES OF GOLF, 14-15 (1997)).
220. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Nemberg, 157 A. 10, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931) (explaining "[i]t is
well known that not every shot played by a golfer goes to the point where he intends it to go. If
such were the case, every player would be perfect and the whole pleasure of the sport would be
lost. It is common knowledge, at least among players, that many bad shots must result although
every stroke is delivered with the best possible intention and without any negligence
whatsoever").
221. See Gyuriak v. Millice, 775 N.E.2d 391, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that golf
courses are designed so that holes are adjacent to one another).
222. Id. (stating "[g]iven the nature of golf course design... the fact that courses are
frequently crowded, often with more than one group playing each of a course's holes at a given
time; and the nature of the game itself, involving shots traveling in excess of 200 yards, it would
appear that a good number of golfers playing a course on a given day would be within each
other's potential range for mis-hit shots").
223. See PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 683 n.39; Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, Inc., 265
N.Y.S. 886, 888 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1933).
224. See Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102, 103 (Pa. 1954) (noting "[w]hile few players know all
the rules of golf, there are three rules and customs which all golfers know: (1) It is the duty of
114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:91
these rules are well-known and are considered forms of etiquette, the
United States Golf Association transcribed them into a formal rulebook.225
One such rule deems it improper to hit a shot when another player is
within the intended range of the ball's path.226 Obviously, this rule
addresses the concern that such a shot may strike the person within that
range. Interestingly, this rule echoes traditional tort principles of
negligence. Like negligence, which imposes liability for the failure to take
precaution when the burden of doing so is outweighed by the potential
severity of injury that may otherwise result,227 this rule of etiquette weighs
the burden of precaution against the harm it is designed to prevent.
Another longstanding golf custom, known even by Australian
surfers,228 requires that players shout a warning whenever their ball travels
in such a way that it has the potential to hit someone.22 9 As Mr. Parkinson
indicated, the word to be shouted is "fore," and its usage is so widespread
that any reasonable person who hears it is likely to heed its message and
take care to avoid being hit in the head.23°
C. Golf and Recklessness: The Implications of Shin
Shin's specific holding-that the primary assumption of risk doctrine
applies to golf-significantly limits the standard of care owed by golfers to
co-participants. 23 Under the doctrine, the court explained that defendant
golfers have breached their duty of care owed to co-participants only if the
golfer intentionally injured a co-participant or engaged in conduct that was
"so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in golf., 232 In other words, a defendant has a duty to avoid acting
every player to give timely and adequate warning-usually by the word 'fore'--of a shot which
he is about to make and which he has reasonable grounds to believe may strike another player,
caddy or spectator, either on the same hole or on a different hole").
225. See U.S. GOLF ASS'N RULES OF GOLF (2008).
226. See id. at 1.
227. See U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (applying the "Hand
Formula" to determine breach of duty in a maritime collision case).
228. See supra Part III.B.
229. Getz, 105 A.2d at 103 (noting that giving adequate warning is one of three rules and
customs that all golfers know).
230. Id. ("It is the duty of every player to give timely and adequate warning-usually by
the word 'fore'-of a shot which he is about to make and which he has reasonable grounds to
believe may strike another player, caddy or spectator, either on the same hole or on a different
hole"); see also Brent Kelly, Golf History FAQ: Why Do Golfers Yell "Fore "for Errant Shots?,
http://golf.about.com/cs/historyofgolf/a/hist fore.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
231. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 582 (Cal. 2007).
232. Id.
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recklessly. 233 Understanding the difference between reckless and negligent
conduct highlights the impact of this different standard as applied to golf.
Importantly, the majority of misconduct that causes accidental injury to
innocent golfers would not amount to recklessness and thus would not lead
to liability under Shin.
The difference between reckless and negligent conduct often depends
on the actor's knowledge of the amount of risk of danger created by their
conduct.234 The Second Restatement of Torts explains that the risk
involved in reckless conduct is "substantially in excess of that necessary to
make the conduct negligent., 235  Thus, the difference between the risks
involved in the two types of misconduct is one of degree.236 The closer the
risk of harm is to substantial certainty, the more likely the conduct will be
deemed reckless.237 Since one "intends" the consequences of his or her act
when the consequence is a "substantial certainty," courts have noted that
recklessness is on a continuum between intentional and negligent
conduct.238
In evaluating the defendant's awareness of the degree of risk of harm
involved in a given activity, 239  courts do not inquire as to whether the
defendant was subjectively aware of the risk.24° Instead, the focus is on
whether, in light of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct,
the defendant either knew or should have known that the conduct created a
high degree of danger. 24  Thus, courts will apply a reasonable person
standard to determine whether the actor is deemed to have known the
danger associated with the conduct.242
Furthermore, implicit in the concept of recklessness is that the risk
233. Admittedly, this conclusion may simplify the specific language in Shin, which seems to
suggest that the recklessness must be evaluated within the context of golf. However, as discussed
infra at note 255 and its accompanying text, California courts have applied the Second
Restatement of Torts to sports-related personal injury lawsuits. The Restatement evaluates an
actor's conduct within the circumstances in which it takes place. Consequently, a determination
of recklessness would focus on the circumstances of the sport anyway.
234. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 8 at 36.
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1965).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note
31, § 8 at 36.
237. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 8 at 36.
238. Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Wis. 1993).
239. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
240. See, e.g., id. § 500 cmt. c.
241. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 443.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. c (1965). It should be emphasized that
the reasonable person standard used here only relates to what a reasonable person would have
known. It does not relate to whether the person's conduct was reasonable. See id.
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itself must be unreasonable under the circumstances. 43 Thus, what is
reckless conduct in one situation is not necessarily negligent in another.244
This idea is particularly important when discussing the differences between
recklessness and negligence in the context of sports. As one court
explained, the unreasonableness of risk in a given sporting event requires a
factual understanding of the way certain sports are played (i.e., the rules
and customs of the game).245 Therefore, when golfers' conduct creates a
substantial degree of dangerous risk to their co-participants, such conduct is
only reckless if it is unreasonable in light of the circumstances normally
associated with the sport (i.e., the rules and customs governing the
sport).
246
Golf, as evidenced by factually similar cases with contrasting
holdings, presents a particularly difficult context for analyzing whether
certain conduct is reckless or negligent.247 Nevertheless, in most instances,
unintentional harm on the golf course arises from negligent, not reckless,
248activity. The following subsections analyze whether the two common
forms of golfer misconduct-hitting the ball when another player is within
range and failing to give warning when one's ball approaches a co-
participant249 -are reckless or negligent.
1. In Most Cases, Hitting a Long-distance Shot when Others Are in the
Potential Range of the Ball Is Negligent but Not Reckless
Established custom forbids players to hit the ball when another player
is within the range of the shot.25" But, does a golfer who fails to heed this
custom and ultimately causes injury act with reckless disregard of the other
player's safety?
243. Id. § 500 cmt. a.
244. See id. § 500 cmt. a; see also Lestina v, W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33
(Wis. 1993) (arguing that the "negligence standard, properly understood and applied,
accomplishes the objectives sought by the courts adopting the recklessness standard").
245. Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990).
246. Id.
247. Compare id. at 707 (explaining that it may be reckless to fail to say "fore" despite the
fact that the golfer knows another is within the line of flight), with Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr.
2d 591, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the failure to yell "fore" is not reckless conduct as
contemplated by the Knight court).
248. See Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594 (holding that the failure to yell "fore" was not
reckless). See supra Part III.B (arguing the failure to yell "fore" is one of the two greatest
instances of misconduct and concluding that much of the accidental harm in golf arises from
negligent conduct).
249. See supra Part III.B.
250. See supra Part III.B.
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California courts, when characterizing the conduct of a golfer who
hits a shot while others are in the intended path of the ball, are likely to
apply the standard of recklessness as set forth in the Second Restatement of
Torts (the "Restatement").25' Under the Restatement, the existence of
recklessness will depend on whether a defendant knew or should have
known that their shot created a substantial degree of risk to others. Thus,
one factor a court is likely to consider is the defendant's proximity to the
plaintiff at the time of the stroke. Not only must the court determine that
the conduct created an unreasonable risk, but that risk must also be
"substantially greater than that which is necessary" to constitute negligent
conduct. 2
This demonstrates that the difference between negligent and reckless
conduct is a matter of degree. 3 For example, when a swinger is closer to
the plaintiff, there is a greater risk that the ball will hit the plaintiff and thus
a greater chance a court will find such conduct reckless. Nevertheless, at
the time of swinging the club, the defendant will usually be far enough
from the plaintiff that it cannot be sufficiently certain that the defendant's
ball would be substantially likely to hit the plaintiff.254 Thus, although
when and how the defendant swings may be unreasonable and therefore
negligent, the defendant has arguably still not acted recklessly.
2. In Most Cases, Failure to Shout "Fore" Is Negligent but Not Reckless.
The next issue is whether the second form of misconduct-failing to
shout "fore"-is negligent or reckless. Certainly, it seems logical that it
would be negligent for golfers to fail to say "fore" when their ball appears
to be headed toward another golfer. In most circumstances, a reasonably
prudent person would find that saying "fore" is a minimum burden
substantially outweighed by the risk of harm.255 However, is the failure to
251. See, e.g., Stimson v. Carlson, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying
the Restatement's definition of recklessness to a primary assumption of risk case arising out of
sailing); Towns v. Davidson, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (applying the
Restatement's definition of recklessness to a primary assumption of risk case arising out of
skiing); but see Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 486-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(Haerle, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply the Restatement's definition of recklessness in favor of
"Knight 'recklessness,"' which looks at what is "totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport").
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
253. Id. § 500 cmt. g (noting that the difference between negligence and recklessness
depends on the likelihood of harm arising from the activity).
254. See id.
255. This comparison of burden to benefits is commonly known as the Hand Formula. See
U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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say "fore" reckless?
To begin, the conduct must be assessed at the moment a reasonable
person would have realized the ball was headed toward another. The
existence of recklessness will depend on whether the defendant knew or
should have known that the failure to shout "fore" placed the plaintiff at an
unreasonable risk of physical harm. The Restatement asks whether the
defendant had knowledge of the facts creating the risk.256 The relevant
inquiry focuses on the apparent trajectory of the defendant's golf ball and
the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's location in relation to the
ball.257 However, even when an airborne ball appears to be heading in the
general vicinity of another golfer, the odds of it actually striking him or her
are still low. Consequently, there would not be a sufficiently "high" degree
of risk, as required by the Restatement, for a finding of recklessness. Thus,
even though relaying a warning can avoid or minimize the risk of being
struck by the defendant's ball, it still seems unlikely that defendant's
failure to yell "fore" amounts to reckless conduct.25 8
The two hypothetical situations discussed above-the act of swinging
when another player is within range of one's shot, and the failure to shout
"fore" when one's ball appears to be headed toward another player-are
259common instances of misconduct leading to golf-related injuries.
However, because neither amounts to recklessness, liability would not
result under Shin against any golfer engaging in such misconduct. 60
IV. THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK
EXCEPTION IS NOT FURTHERED BY THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO
GOLF
As discussed above, Shin v. Ahn departs from the general California
rule that requires people to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable harm.261  By
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1965).
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
258. See, e.g., Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that "the failure to yell 'fore... was not "reckless or intentional conduct contemplated by the
Knight Court").
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. Notably, Shin was remanded to the lower court on the issue of recklessness. However,
based on the reasoning above, it is likely that future courts will conclude that such conduct does
not amount to recklessness.
261. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714, cmt. a (West 2004) (stating "[e]very one is responsible, not
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his [or her]
want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his [or her] property or person, except so far
as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself [or
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definition, however, a general rule is subject to exceptions. In California,
for example, courts have explained that the "existence of '[d]uty' is not an
immutable fact of nature but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection. 262
California courts emphasize this mutable nature of duty when dealing
with the duty of care owed by a sporting participant. 63 As one court stated,
"[w]hen the injury is to a sporting participant, the considerations of policy
and the question of duty necessarily become intertwined. ' 264 This Note has
discussed the policy considerations of both historic and modem California
courts.265 However, golf does not raise these considerations and, thus, there
is no need to stray from the regular rules of care that generally govern
society. Accordingly, a golfer should not suddenly shed the obligation to
take care simply by stepping onto the golf course.
A. The Policy Reasons Underlying the Historical Notions of Assumption of
Risk Do Not Compel the Application of the Doctrine to Protect a Careless
Golfer
1. Historic Ideals Favoring the Promotion of Individualism Do Not
Suggest the Doctrine Should Be Applied to Golf.
Various policy reasons are given to explain the rise of the assumption
of risk defense at common law.266 For example, some view the doctrine as
a manifestation of the desire to compel people to take individual care to
avoid danger.267 When applied to golf, this policy may, at first glance,
seem to suggest that golfers should be responsible for their own self-
protection. However, even historically there were no absolute obligations
to avoid all danger.268 At a minimum, defendants were obliged to afford
others the opportunity to protect themselves.
269
herself]."); see also Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 391 (Cal. 2006) (citing
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
262. Avila, 131 P.3d at 391 (citing Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 80 (Cal.
1997)) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
263. See, e.g.,Avila, 131 P.3d at 391.
264. Id.
265. See supra Part I.
266. See supra Part II.
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. See supra Part II.B (discussing how ideas of individual care were tempered as society
grew more interdependent upon one another for care as a result of industrialization).
269. Bohlen, supra note 53 at 15-16.
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It is unlikely that principles of individualism would compel a court to
reduce the liability of a negligent golfer who engages in one of the two
hypothetical examples of misconduct described above. 270  For instance,
when a defendant swings while another player is within the intended range
of the shot it would be very difficult for the other player to take any care to
avoid getting hit by the ball. To do so would require them to incessantly
scan the sky for airborne balls. This would be distracting and burdensome
and could cause some golfers to stay home instead of playing.
Furthermore, common law imposed, at the very least, the requirement
that the defendant give the plaintiff the opportunity to engage in self-
protection. 7' In the context of golf, this would involve one of two actions:
the defendant may wait for the other golfer to leave the green, or the
defendant could shout "fore" to warn the other golfer of the incoming
ball.2 2 Either way, a defendant's historic obligations would be virtually
identical to the obligations imposed by modern-day rules of etiquette,
which, as described above,273 also require a golfer to wait before hitting and
give adequate warnings of incoming balls. 274
In the second example of potential misconduct, the defendant failed to
shout "fore" when their ball unintentionally heads toward another player.
Here, the misconduct is the failure to provide warning. This misconduct
breaches the historic obligation to afford the plaintiff the opportunity to
seek protection from the potential injury. Assuming that the defendant
shouts "fore" loud enough to be heard,275 the plaintiff will have the
opportunity to avoid the ball.276 Nevertheless, under California's new
standard of care for golfers, the effect of Shin will be to negate any
obligation on the part of the defendant to shout "fore."
270. See supra Part III.B.
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra Part II.B.
273. See supra Part III.B.
274. This Note does not focus on the outcome if the defendant had warned the plaintiff
about his or her intention to swing, and the plaintiff was aware of the warning but was injured
when he or she failed to move out of the way. Such a scenario would present issues of express
assumption of risk (if the defendant expressly warned the plaintiff) or secondary assumption of
risk (if the defendant breached a duty but the plaintiff voluntarily faced the risk caused by such
breach).
275. It will usually be the case that the sound of a player's voice will carry at least as far as
the distance in which the ball travels.
276. Again, this Note does not focus on the results if the defendant had given the
appropriate warning and the plaintiff nevertheless failed to take proper precautions. Clearly, the
defendant would argue that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to heed the warning. This would
be a secondary assumption of risk issue.
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2. Historic Concerns Regarding the Protection of Industry Do Not Apply
to Golf
The rise of assumption of risk is also explained as the manifestation
of the policy of nineteenth century courts to protect growing industries
from the threat of employee lawsuits.277 Under this view, American and
English courts placed paramount importance on the economic success of
growing industries.2 78 For this historic principle to justify the application
of the doctrine today, it would have to be assumed that courts view the golf
industry in the same light as they viewed the industrial giants of the
nineteenth century.
This is hard to believe for two reasons. First, today's golf industry is
miniscule compared to the industries protected by the assumption of risk
doctrine in the nineteenth century. Second, holding a golfer liable for his
negligent conduct would not necessarily burden the golf industry. To
begin, the golf industry has nothing to gain directly from a legal doctrine
that applies only to co-participants since, in either situation, a single
member of the golfing community will be stuck with the loss. The only
way the rule could affect the industry is if it substantially affects the total
number of people who golf. As will be argued infra, a golfer could be as
affected by the fear of uncompensated injury as by the fear of liability.
27 9
In light of these reasons, it appears that applying a regular standard of care
to golfers would not frustrate the historic concern of protecting big
industry. Again, the Shin ruling finds no historic support for its departure
from the traditional rule.
3. Even if a Court Were to Apply Assumption of Risk to Golf, It Would
Likely Find That the Shin Plaintiff Had Not Assumed the Risk
Assuming a court applied the historic version of assumption of risk to
a golf injury case, the likely result would still differ from Shin.
Historically, the assumption of risk doctrine focused on whether the
plaintiff had voluntarily faced a known specific risk.280  Arguably, an
injured golfer would not have had any knowledge that he faced a particular
risk from any particular ball on any particular play. Though a plaintiff may
understand that it is possible to be struck by a ball, such understanding is
277. See supra Part II.B.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (arguing that more players would golf under the negligence
standard).
280. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 248; see also Bohlen, supra note 53, at 14.
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different from, and not as specific as, consenting to being struck by a
negligently hit ball.281
Thus, two of the historic reasons for applying this limited standard of
care are not applicable to golf. Nevertheless, California law is different.
California's primary assumption of risk doctrine is guided by different
282 thexnconsiderations. To the extent these policy reasons are not implicated in
golf, Shin has arguably erred in its application of California precedent.
B. California Precedent Does Not Support the Application ofAssumption
ofRisk to Golf
In Knight, the California Supreme Court delineated several
justifications for limiting the standard of care owed by a participant in a
game of football.283 The Knight court's reasoning for this deviation is best
understood by first explaining how and when it intended the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk to be applied. In the context of sports, the court
explained that primary assumption of risk applies by limiting duty to
preclude liability for injuries arising from an inherent risk of the sport.2 84
The court held that some risks are so inherent to the nature of the sport that
the plaintiff is deemed to have assumed the risks by deciding to play.285
The defendant's duty was limited to avoid increasing those risks.286
The court explained how this limitation of duty would promote
certain policies.287 The court's reasoning began with the premise that
participants in active sports, like baseball and football, sometimes act
carelessly in the "heat" of competition. 88 Proceeding from this factual
premise, the court reasoned that the imposition of liability for such careless
behavior would lead to two negative outcomes. 289  First, it could cause
players to "chill" their vigorous participation to avoid liability for what
281. See Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778, 790 (D. Haw. 1993) (holding
that a defendant could not invoke primary assumption of risk as a defense to an action on behalf
of a deceased scuba diver who had known some, but not all, of the risks involved in diving at 140
feet).
282. See supra Part II.C.
283. See supra Parts II.C-D.
284. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).
285. Id. at 708-09.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 710.
288. Id.; see also Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that
the elevated reckless standard was based on the fact that the competitive nature of contact sports
led people to be less careful than they otherwise would be).
289. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
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would otherwise be ordinary conduct within the sport. 290 This, in turn,
leads to the second negative repercussion-when athletes stop participating
vigorously in their sport, the sport itself changes. The court characterized
this second negative outcome as fundamentally altering "the nature of the
sport.
2 9 1
Thus, to merit the application of the Knight standard of care to the
sport of golf, it must likewise be shown that the imposition of a regular
standard of care would cause the fundamental nature of golf to change.
Golf, however, does not posses the same characteristics present in the
active sports discussed in Knight, and consequently, its fundamental nature
would not change by imposing a regular standard of care. To demonstrate
how golf differs from the sports contemplated in Knight, consider how a
sport like tackle football would change if its participants had to act
carefully.
1. Football Is Not "Fore" Everyone.
"At the base of it was the urge, if you wanted to play football, to
knock someone down, that was what the sport was all about, the
will to win closely linked with contact." - George Plimpton
292
Unless George Plimpton thinks that golfers have an underlying urge
to knock down an opposing player, it sounds like he would disagree that
golf and football are similar. This distinction is critical because, as
previously discussed, the question of duty is highly contextual and
dependent on whether the factual nature of a given sport justifies a lower
standard of care.293 This section describes a typical football play in order to
demonstrate how football, unlike golf, would truly suffer if its players were
subjected to the traditional rule requiring them to take reasonable care. By
using a sport of such physical nature, it is possible to see the ways in which
a sport's fundamental character would change with the application of
normal duty rules. Consequently, by showing the ways in which the
doctrine was intended to apply, it is then easier to substantiate the argument
that it should not apply to golf.
Consider football through a hypothetical play. Suppose, for example,
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 10k Truth Football Quotes, http://www. 10ktruth.com/the-quotes/football.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2008).
293. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 700 (distinguishing assumption of risk defenses in the
sports context from those in "other settings").
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that the defensive coach calls a play requiring the linebacker to "blitz" the
quarterback. This play requires the linebacker to run full-speed toward the
quarterback. The linebacker's purpose is to either tackle the quarterback
before the ball is thrown or to disrupt the quarterback's concentration
enough to force a bad pass. Yet, under the rules of football, a defensive
player is not allowed to hit the quarterback who has already released the
ball.294 The sport enforces this rule by assessing a penalty against the
defensive team and awarding the offensive team extra yards and a first
down.2 95 But, should a blitzing linebacker who hits the quarterback after
the ball has already been thrown be civilly liable if the quarterback is
injured? 296
To answer the question, consider how this play may differ if civil
liability were imposed. First, assume the linebacker knows the law on civil
liability.297 Next, recall the discussion in Knight regarding the fact that
298certain sports naturally involved some careless conduct. Consider how
this is true in football, where a defensive player's performance has been
said to hinge on the ability to play with "reckless abandon." 299 Now, think
about how the imposition of civil liability for such inherent misconduct
would affect the linebacker. Knight suggests that the threat of litigation
294. See NFL Rules Digest: Protection of the Passer,
http://www.nfl.com/rulebook/protectionofpasser (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (explaining the rules
regarding protection of the passer with possession of the ball).
295. See NFL Rules Digest: Summary of Penalties,
http://www.nfl.com/rulebooklpenaltysummaries (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (listing all penalties
by category). Note that, technically, the violation would be "roughing the passer" and subject to
the most severe penalty, 15 yards.
296. This analysis assumes that the linebacker's hit on the quarterback was not late or
egregious enough to constitute the intentional tort of battery. For a case where battery was found,
see Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
297. Admittedly, this may be a big assumption. A simple Google search for "football
player" and "arrested" demonstrates why. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer,
Handicapped Parking, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 81 (2000) (discussing the UCLA handicap parking
scandal in which members of the team illegally used false handicap placards); ASSOCIATED
PRtEss, USC Football Recruit Maurice Simmons Arrested for Robbery, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f--n/a/2008/03/07/sports/s085324S6.DTL (regarding
arrest of USC recruit Maurice Simmons); ASSOCIATED PRESS, Two Syracuse Players Arrested,
Mar. 6, 2008, http://collegefootball.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=782834 (two Syracuse football
players arrested). But, note that many football players are upstanding citizens. See, e.g., Bill
Pennington, et al., Ex-NFL Player Is Killed in Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004, at Dl
(reporting the combat death of Pat Tillman, "whose decision to give up a lucrative NFL career to
join the Army Rangers made him one of the most public examples of patriotism in the aftermath
of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001").
298. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 711 (citing Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601
F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979)).
299. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 318 (using the term "reckless" in a non-legal
sense).
2008] THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD TAKE A MULLIGAN 125
would cause players to alter their performance so as to avoid liability.
300
The end result, according to Knight, would chill the player's vigorous
participation.30 1
In football, the nature of the game would change if a linebacker's
actions were more restrained. This alteration would begin with the
linebacker's change in mindset. Rather than focusing on the game, the
linebacker would be concerned about liability. The linebacker's new
concern-liability-would ultimately change their athletic movements
during the play. For one, linebackers would tone down their speed of
pursuit, which in turn, would reduce the force in which linebackers hit the
quarterbacks. In this sense, the linebacker has become a lethargic
participant.
As Knight explained, the linebacker's lack of vigorous participation
will cause a fundamental change in the way football is played.30 2 Now that
the linebacker has reduced the intensity of the blitz, it is less likely that he
will achieve the original purpose of the play-sacking or hurrying the
quarterback. The blitz has now become ineffective. Furthermore, the
linebacker is unlikely to get close enough to the quarterback in time to
compensate for the lack of defensive coverage.30 3 The quarterback, now
unhindered by any blitzing linebacker, will have an easier time passing to
an open receiver. Given the ineffectiveness of the blitz, it is unlikely this
play will ever be used. With the removal of this longstanding and effective
defensive tactic from the playbook, the fundamental balance between
offense and defense will tilt in the offense's favor. As such, the
fundamental nature of the game has changed.
Knight avoided this problem by barring recovery for merely negligent
conduct in certain active sports.304 In this hypothetical, the linebacker's
late hit on the quarterback was arguably careless. A person of reasonable
prudence would not slam into a defenseless player in this fashion. Indeed,
the application of the Hand Formula305 supports this argument. The risk of
300. For those inclined to argue that the linebacker would be dissuaded from engaging in
this conduct due to the existence of rules that would penalize such conduct, it is submitted here
that the rules of the game are not sufficient to eliminate this conduct. One need only watch even
an hour's worth of NFL to see a player engage in dangerous conduct that results in a penalty.
While such repercussions generally deter such conduct, they do not have the same effect that the
imposition of liability would have upon that defender in the event that the quarterback is injured.
301. Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
302. Id.
303. Whenever a linebacker blitzes, one more offensive player is left "open" to receive a
pass. Thus, a blitz is most effective if it allows the linebacker to quickly disrupt the quarterback.
304. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711.
305. See supra notes 224 and 252 and accompanying text.
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harm to the quarterback, while slim, still outweighs the utility generated by
the linebacker's actions. Other than a five- to fifteen-yard penalty assessed
against their team, linebackers have nothing to gain in the play by hitting
the quarterback once the ball has been released.30 6
Although the linebacker's actions would be careless, it is less likely
that they would be deemed reckless. As mentioned above, the line between
recklessness and carelessness often centers upon the degree of the risk
caused by the conduct in light of the circumstances involved in the sport.
307
In tackle football, the linebacker's rush at the quarterback is often
frustrated by huge offensive linemen, whose blocking serves to impede the
linebacker's path. Furthermore, even a linebacker who tackles a
quarterback without obstruction is unlikely to cause the quarterback death
or substantial physical harm-the type of harm contemplated by the
Restatement. Consequently, the linebacker in this hypothetical would be
viewed as careless, but not reckless.
The linebacker blitz illustration demonstrates why a limited standard
of care is necessary in certain sports. By comparison, a regular standard of
care would not cause the same problems in golf.30 8 To begin, the initial
premise in Knight-that careless conduct is inherent in certain sports3°9 -
would not apply to golf. In Knight, the court explained that such
carelessness arises from "normal energetic conduct." 310 In golf, the
opportunity to make a prudent choice does not occur during the
performance of an athletic movement, and hence, does not occur during
normal energetic conduct. Because Knight's initial premise-that some
sports involve inherent carelessness 31'--does not exist in golf, the policy
concerns expressed in Knight will also not apply.
As discussed in Part III, there are two predominant ways in which a
golfer may carelessly injure other players: by hitting a ball when another is
in the ball's intended path, or by failing to yell "fore" when a ball is
heading towards another player.312 The carelessness present in these two
examples is not a natural part of golf the way a linebacker's late hit is in
football. Carelessness in football nearly always arises during an athletic
306. The linebacker could argue that the utility does not necessarily come from the contact,
but the threat of such contact. This argument will be discussed below insofar as a quarterback
who is not faced with such pressure will find that the offensive game is suddenly easier.
307. Knight, 834 P.2d at 712.
308. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 333 (stating "there would be no 'chilling effect' on
golfers by applying negligence principles").
309. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See supra Part III.
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movement. When the linebacker hits the quarterback after the quarterback
has released the ball, the linebacker does so mid-sprint. The same is true
when a baseball player releases the bat with unnecessary force after hitting
a ball,313 or when a soccer player collides with the opposing goalie just
inside the penalty box during a dash for the ball.314 In each example, the
injury occurred while the athlete was performing a physical movement in
furtherance of the competitive objective.
But unlike players in football, baseball, or soccer, a golfer's athletic
motion is not involved in either one of the two common forms of
misconduct. For instance, when the golfer carelessly hits the ball while
another participant is within range of the shot, the opportunity to take care
occurred before the golfer's athletic movement began.315 The golfer's
carelessness occurred when the choice was made to swing-a moment of
contemplation, not an athletic movement.31 6 In contrast, the linebacker was
sprinting and avoiding offensive linemen when he hit the quarterback.
Nor does a golfer's failure to shout "fore" occur during an athletic
movement. Rather, golfers have already engaged in an athletic motion in
their swing and follow-through. The opportunity to take care would arise
at the instant a reasonable person would see that another player in the ball's
flight path would be adequately warned by shouting "fore." Because the
golfer's follow-through has already occurred, the choice at this moment
does not occur during any athletic motion. Thus, unlike in basketball,
where the elbowing player acts carelessly while jumping in the air, the
golfer "acts" carelessly while gazing into the sky. As such, golfers cannot
blame the unwise conduct on carelessness brought about by the heat of
competition.
Consequently, because the two common forms of carelessness in golf
do not occur during the athlete's physical motion, carelessness is not
inherent in golf in the way originally understood by Knight.
317
Unfortunately, cases like Schick and Dilger missed this point, and instead
equated a golfer's awareness of the possibility of being struck by a
carelessly hit ball to Knight's meaning of an inherent risk.318 However, the
Knight court's reasoning stemmed from the presumption that certain sports
313. See, e.g., Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So.2d 831 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
314. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975).
315. Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 332.
316. See id. at 330 (stating that "the ball is stationary when hit, as is the player").
317. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
318. See Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 593-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Schick v.
Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 968 (N.J. 2001).
128 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:91
involved inherent carelessness. 31 9 Since this presumption has been shown
not to exist in the context of golf,320 the negative outcomes that the Knight
court sought to avoid would not arise in golf
For example, a golfer's vigorous participation would not be chilled
due to the imposition of liability for careless conduct.321 As used in Knight
and its progeny, the term "vigorous" refers to the manner in which an
athlete performs while engaging in competition. 322 In this sense, holding a
golfer to a standard of reasonable care would not alter a golfer's vigorous
32332participation. A golfer performs by swinging a club.324 Thus, requiring
golfers to wait for others to vacate the area or shout "fore" after hitting the
ball would not affect the manner of their performance.325
In contrast, a linebacker, whose effectiveness often depends on speed
and power, would be chilled from vigorous participation because of
liability concerns. A regular standard of care would affect both the speed
and power of the linebacker's performance. Thus, unlike in golf, a regular
standard of care does affect how a football player performs. A golfer, by
contrast, can participate vigorously despite any potential liability for
carelessness.
The second negative consequence expressed in Knight was that
imposing liability could alter the fundamental nature of many sports.326
Such alteration stems from the fact that when the participants play with less
vigor, the game itself changes. However, as shown above, a golfer will
continue to play in the same manner and with the same vigor even when
subjected to a carelessness standard of conduct. A golfer will continue to
eye the hole, focus on the ball, take a practice stroke, step forward, and take
the real swing. As the United States Supreme Court recognized, the
"essence of [golf is] shotmaking, '3 27 and a carelessness standard would not
fundamentally affect a golfer's shot. With the golfer's manner of
performance remaining unchanged, nothing fundamental about the nature
of the sport will change.
Because ordinary careless conduct is not part and parcel to golf, legal
319. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
320. Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 330-31.
321. Id. at 331.
322. SeeKnight, 834 P.2d at 710.
323. Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 331.
324. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001) (observing "[flrom early
on, the essence of the game has been shotmaking").
325. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 331 (discussing how golfers will not improve their
game by acting with disregard towards the safety of others).
326. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992).
327. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001).
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liability for such conduct will not chill a golfer's vigorous participation and
will not fundamentally change the game. 328 In fact, some argue that the
golfing experience will improve under this regular standard of care.329 By
encouraging careful behavior, the standard would deter undesirable
conduct, and players could play without fearing carelessly hit balls. 330 If
remaining "cool" improves a golfer's game,33' playing without the fear of a
stray ball could prolong a golfer's relaxed state and further improve their
game. In this sense, a regular standard of care would help a golfer's
game.
332
Relying on the rationale used in Dilger, the Shin court further
discussed how holding participants liable for missed hits would "encourage
lawsuits and deter players from enjoying the sport. 333 Yet, this is not
necessarily true. For one, the argument is inaccurate-a negligence
standard would not lead to liability for mere "missed" hits.3 34 A golfer
must also have carelessly "missed" the hit and proximately caused an
injury.335  Without these elements, liability will not result. The Dilger
opinion supports this conclusion as it recognized that golf balls sometimes
go awry, and that "[i]f every ball behaved as the golfer wished, there would
be little 'sport' in the sport of golf." 336 This statement demonstrates that
courts can distinguish between accidents caused without fault, and "mis-
hits" which actually warrant the imposition of liability.
Secondly, even assuming that some players would be deterred from
playing golf due to mis-hit liability, the Dilger analysis still comes up
short. In concluding that potential mis-hit liability would cause fewer
players to engage in the sport, 3 the court failed to consider the potential
effects that a lower standard of care might have on the frequency of golf
play. As some have argued, the lower standard will discourage careful
play.338  As a result, safety-conscious golfers may refrain from
328. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 331.




333. Shin v. Alm, 165 P.3d 581, 587 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d
591, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
334. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 332-33.
335. Id. at 331-32 (explaining that "any plaintiffwould have to plead and prove that the
defendant golfer causing the injury acted without reasonable care").
336. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
337. Id. at 591.
338. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 331; see also Zurla v. Hydel, 651 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that requiring a reckless standard in golf would undermine
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participating.339 Mr. Parkinson's admonishment to avoid Andy Irons when
on the golf course lends support for this theory.340
Finally, Shin erroneously relied on Dilger for the theory that a regular
standard of care would encourage a burdensome amount of lawsuits.341
This theory assumes there are enough golf-related injuries to create a
burden on the courts to resolve them. While the actual number of golf-
related injuries that occur every year in California remains unknown, the
number likely falls far below the number of car accidents.342 Yet, the court
has not raised the burden for plaintiffs injured in car accidents.
Furthermore, the "floodgates" theory is problematic since a higher standard
of care would encourage people to take care. With more people being
careful, the number of injuries would likely drop; consequently, there
would be fewer tort suits plugging up the judicial system.
343
V. CONCLUSION
In unintentional injury cases, the general rule imposing a duty to act
reasonably has been long-established. 3 However, in states like
California, courts are willing to depart from this general rule in an effort to
promote certain policies. One common instance of departure occurs in the
context of sports. In order to ensure that people continue to vigorously
participate in sports, courts have assessed liability only for reckless
"reasonable incentives" to take care); see also Tort Law-Sports Torts-California Supreme
Court Extends Assumption of Risk To Noncontact Sports-Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007),
121 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1259-60 (2008) (commenting that "it is unclear whether California's
assumption of risk standard is more effective at avoiding the chilling effect that so concerned the
majority [of the Shin court] than would the application of traditional negligence principles"); see
also Jagger v. Mohawk Mt. Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813, 832 (Conn. 2004) (arguing that
requiring skiers to act reasonably will promote and not deter vigorous participation).
339. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 334; see also Tort Law-Sports Torts-California
Supreme Court Extends Assumption of Risk To Noncontact Sports-Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581
(Cal. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1259-60 (2008) (stating "[a]lthough some recreational
athletes may be emboldened by the tort protections they enjoy, others might shy away from
vigorous participation in sports, out of fear of absorbing the burden of nonremediable,
nonreckless injuries").
340. See SURFER MAGAZINE, supra note 213, at 121.
341. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
342. CAR ACCIDENT LAWYER PROS, Statistics on Car Accidents in California,
http://www.caraccidentlawyerpros.com/Statistics-on-Car-Accidents-in-Califomia.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2008) (noting that California ranked number one in the United States in car
accidents in 2006 with 4,236).
343. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 334 (explaining how golf injuries may be prevented by
creating a greater incentive to behave carefully).
344. See generally Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 715-17 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
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conduct. 345 In so doing, courts have stated the purpose is to maintain the
fundamental nature of the sport.346
While these considerations are valid in light of certain sports, golf
does not raise such considerations. Indeed, golfers will not alter their
athletic movement nor play with less skill out of fear of liability. The sport
of golf will not change if the law requires golfers to wait patiently for other
participants to move away. Nor would the sport change if its participants
were charged with warning others of a misfired ball. Golfers would not
suddenly chill their vigorous participation if they were required to be
careful because golfers could continue to play in the same manner as they
had before. The sport would not change in any fundamental way. As such,
the specified policy reasons underlying the exception from the general rule
do not apply.
Golf has always been a game of etiquette and sportsmanship.
Applying a doctrine originally based on the idea that plaintiffs should be
held liable for the risks they voluntarily encounter would misconstrue both
the assumption of risk doctrine and the sport of golf. As Joel Parkinson
asserted, even world famous Australian surfers do not anticipate injuries
when they step onto a golf course.347 In fact, when a golfer worries about
being hit by an errant ball, they might even choose not to play. For the
reasons expressed herein, the Shin court erred in applying the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk to golf. However, as with golf, it is never too
late for the court to admit its shank, take a mulligan, and try again. If not,
perhaps the legislature should take a shot.
Brian P. Harlan*
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